bring the "Constitution in Exile" in from the cold seem anything but academic exercises. 4 Notwithstanding this hue and cry, Congress seems a bit oblivious to its fate. Although the Democratically controlled Senate Judiciary Committee may soon take recent Supreme Court decisionmaking into account when confirming President George W. Bush's judicial nominees, Congress has yet to strike back at the Court in any meaningful way. Indeed, rather than condemn the Court and launch a counteroffensive, Congress has paid little notice to the Court's decisionmaking. If anything, as I will argue in this Essay, Congress had been (and still may be) spurring the Court into action by signaling its indifference to the constitutional fate of its handiwork. First, Congress, through word and deed, increasingly treats the Court as if it is the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution. Second, unless responding to a Supreme Court decision invalidating federal legislation, Congress has shown little interest in taking Court rulings into account when crafting constitutionally problematic laws. Third, by slowing down the confirmation process, by failing to increase the salaries of federal judges, and by disregarding calls to limit federal court litigation to matters that are truly national, Congress has made the job of being a federal judge less desirable.
For all these reasons, the Court has had little incentive to accommodate Congress and, if anything, it may see the invalidation of some federal statutes as a way both to assert its own power and to pay Congress back for its insensitive management of the courts. Furthermore, there has been little reason for the Justices to fear reprisal. Congress's rhetoric emphasizes the supremacy of the Court's interpretation of the Constitution. Moreover, the Justices' invalidation of federal statutes has left intact analogous state programs and, for the most part, allowed Congress to revisit issues by recrafting the invalidated statutes.
In calling attention to how Congress's attitudes toward both the Court and the Constitution may have factored into the Court's decisionmaking, I see my project as complementing Christopher Schroeder's examination of recent decisions invalidating federal statutes. 5. See generally Schroeder, supra note 4 (suggesting that the Rehnquist Court's federalism opinions are motivated by a distrust of the federal government). minutes before registering its approval." 11 Because Congress failed, among other things, to build a record to support the measure's impact on interstate commerce, Justices sympathetic to the statutory scheme complained that the government did not present its case in a convincing way. 12 The Debt Relief Act likewise "inspired a storm of controversy [over] its validity." 13 Criticized as "one of the worst recent examples of draftsmanship in federal legislation," the bill was "hastily drafted and hurriedly passed" by a "harried Congress." 14 When signing the measure, Franklin Delano Roosevelt spoke of the bill as "loosely worded . . . [and] requir [ing] amendment at the next session of Congress." 15 These words proved prophetic, for, immediately after the act was invalidated in Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 16 Louis Brandeis, the opinion's author, lamented that " [t] he President has been living in a fool's paradise . . . . I should not be surprised if everything would have to be redrafted." 17 The Railroad Retirement and Debt Relief Acts typify early New Deal legislation-not well-drawn and tying "sweeping assertions of federal power to slap-dash justifications."
18 Senate Judiciary Chairman Henry Ashurst described the period this way: "We ground out laws so fast . . . . [we] reasoned from non-existent premises and, at times, we seemed to accept chimeras, phantasies and exploded social and economic theories as our authentic guides." 19 Along the same lines, Justice Harlan Fiske Stone spoke of " [t] he general sloppiness of everything that has been done in connection with this effort" and his 11 . WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTION- AL "hope that Congress will now undertake to do its job." 20 Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes complained that "the laws have been poorly drafted, the briefs have been badly drawn and the arguments have been poorly presented." 21 Failings of Congress, of course, tell only part of the story. After all, had the Court wanted to uphold these programs, the legal landmines that the Justices deployed to limit federal power never would have been devised in the first place. At the same time, the Court's willingness, starting in 1937, to sign on to the New Deal is partially attributable to Congress's decision to take the Court's rulings into account when crafting legislation. Unlike the "loose draftsmanship and emotional advocacy" of the First New Deal, observed Arthur Schlessinger, the laws of this "Second New Deal were masterpieces of the lawyer's art." 22 The lesson here is simple: Congress cannot turn its back on the Court and expect to get away with it. Indeed, public acceptance of judicial independence and supremacy ultimately proved damaging both to Roosevelt and his proposal to pack the Court with Justices "who will bring to the Courts a present-day sense of the Constitution." Scalia's comments, of course, are self-serving. In pointing to Congress's misdeeds, Scalia (never hinting that the Court is sharply divided) suggested that the Justices have little choice but to strike down the abominations that Congress is throwing its way. 27 More to
Court departs from "its fortress in public opinion," it may well suffer from self-inflicted wounds). 25. Taylor, supra note 1, at 1811. 26. Id. 27. Here, I think, is where I part company with Professor Schroeder. While it is certainly true that increasingly negative attitudes toward the federal government help create the occasion for the Justices to engage in "motivated reasoning" and strike down federal legislation, I think Schroeder pays insufficient attention to the fact that the Court often divides five to four in these cases. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (invalidating part of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act in a 5-4 decision); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1996) (invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones Act in a 5-4 decision); see also Schroeder, supra note 4, at 310 (mentioning that the central decisions of the post-Lopez Court are identical 5-4 votes). Specifically, if negative attitudes toward government explain the recent shift in Court decisionmaking, why are four Justices (including the two newest members of the Court) insensitive to this phenomenon? Indeed, had Al Gore become president, there is every reason to think that a Gore appointee would have discounted this growing distrust of Congress and, in so doing, shifted the balance on the Court to those favoring pro-Congress rulings. By way of contrast, as I the point, Scalia and other Justices willing to curtail Congress's powers are ideologically predisposed to limit lawmakers' prerogatives and, in so doing, to hear cases where they can point the finger at Congress for overstepping its enumerated powers. 28 Nevertheless, there is reason to think that there are several kernels of truth in Scalia's rebuke. Congress does seem disinterested both in defending its turf as coequal interpreter of the Constitution and in thinking through the consequences of Supreme Court decisions. As a result, legislative drafting-as was true during the early New Deal-appears to be, at best, sloppy and, at worst, a direct invitation to the Court to strike down Congress's enactments.
In making this point, this section offers some anecdotal evidence about Congress-Court relations. My aim is not so much to offer definitive proof; instead, it is to detail why-based on my observations over the past several years-I have come to think that Congress has played a significant role in the ongoing imbroglio over the scope of its powers.
A. Congress and Constitutional Interpretation
Congress is increasingly abdicating its core powers, including its power to interpret the Constitution independently. 29 One manifestation of this phenomenon is the growing use of "expedited Supreme Court review" provisions in cases for which Congress finds its handiwork constitutionally suspect. Specifically, rather than sorting out the constitutionality of the legislation it is considering, Congress sometimes enacts a fast-track provision enabling litigants both to bypass the federal courts of appeal and to secure automatic Supreme Court review. 31 Over the past several years, Congress has included expedited review provisions on several high-profile enactments, including flag burning legislation, 32 the Gramm-Rudman Act, 33 and census reform legislation. 36 In all these statutes, the expedited review provision was not part of the original bill; instead, after constitutional objections were raised, Congress-rather than settle the issue itself-decided that it was best to hand the matter off to the Supreme Court.
37
The Line Item Veto Act exemplifies how expedited review provisions, in effect, delegate Congress's power to interpret the Constitution to the Supreme Court. 38 Although Senator Robert Byrd spoke of the oath that each member takes to "support and defend the Constitution," and, with it, Congress's responsibility to "be resolving those [ [As to the legislation's constitutionality,] I do not know who is right. The courts have to make that determination." 41 Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court struck down the Line Item Veto Act. 42 The Justices almost always invalidate congressional statutes that contain expedited review provisions. 43 And why not? Congress cannot possibly object to such Court decisions, for the expedited review provision makes clear that Congress sees itself as subordinate to the Court and, consequently, has little stake in the constitutional fate of its handiwork. 44. For a related argument, see Mark Graber, The Non-Majoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35, 37-68 (1993) (arguing that lawmakers occasionally leave it to the courts to address contentious political issues the lawmakers could not adequately resolve). prayer), 45 the modern Congress hardly ever casts doubt on either the correctness of the Court's rulings or, more fundamentally, the Court's power to interpret the Constitution authoritatively. 46 Consider, for example, Congress's response to Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 47 a 1995 Supreme Court decision declaring that federal affirmative action programs must satisfy the Court's strictest standard of judicial review. 48 In the immediate wake of the Court's decision, Senator Phil Gramm proposed eliminating set-asides for minorities and women in federal contracting. Gramm explained, "my amendment is written in total conformity with Adarand. . . . That is, if the court finds that a contractor was [personally] subject to discrimination, the court may provide a remedy with a set-aside . . . ." 49 In sharp contrast, Senator Arlen Specter called attention to Adarand's recognition that the government may act in response to "both the practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination."
50 Along these lines, Senator Patty Murray countered Gramm's efforts by proposing that federal funds can be used only for "programs . (1974) . In believing that "they could assure the legitimacy of the process and the legitimacy of the winner of the presidency," the members of the Court reached out to decide a fundamental question that, in critical respects, the Constitution delegated to the Congress. Gerald Gunther, A Risky Moment for the Court, Gramm-Murray exchange, they certainly know that a legislative backlash has not followed in the wake of recent rulings limiting congressional power. There is no talk of packing the Court, of stripping it of jurisdiction, 55 or of amending the Constitution in response to these rulings. Moreover, these decisions played no role in the 2000 elections. 56 Finally, Congress has shown relatively little interest in rewriting these statutes. 57 
B. Congress and the Drafting of Constitutional Legislation
That Congress sometimes equates Supreme Court decisionmaking with the Constitution speaks more of legislators' interest in achieving desired political outcomes than anything else. Opponents of legislation, when raising constitutional objections, are on firmer footing when they suggest that the federal courts will strike down a measure. And, as was true with Phil Gramm's effort to undo setasides, proponents of initiatives likewise seek to bolster their case by claiming that they are simply effectuating the decisions of the Supreme Court. Moreover, by embracing expedited review provisions (that short-circuit fights over a measure's constitutionality), bill supporters help to secure passage of a favored measure. Finally, when recrafting legislation in accordance with a Supreme Court decision, Congress often is motivated by the interests of the constituencies that supported the legislation in the first place.
Just as talk of the Court's status as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution may be a rhetorical device used to pursue political ends, it is to be expected that Congress sometimes ignores the Court in order to pursue a political end. For this reason, I think it especially useful to examine some recent occasions in which Congress seemed, at best, indifferent to the Court. Before turning to these examples, a few words on why the recent spate of anti-Congress Rehnquist Court rulings is, in part, a by-product of such legislative indifference. Specifically, just as talk of judicial supremacy encourages the Court to see itself as supreme and, consequently, to place more and more constraints on Congress, legislative indifference to Court rulings creates more and more occasions in which Congress will run afoul of those ever-increasing constraints. And if Congress fails to challenge the Court by asserting its independent voice in interpreting the Constitu- (D-AR) ) (characterizing the Lopez decision as a warning that congressional power under the Commerce Clause is subject to outer limits); 146 CONG. REC. S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch (R-UT) and Sen. Kennedy (D-MA)) (noting that the Gun-Free School Zones Act and the Violence Against Women Act were struck down because they regulated noneconomic activity). In 1995, Lopez's precedential value was mentioned ten times by members of Congress. On nine other occasions, the case was mentioned in connection with letters and memoranda entered into the Congressional Record. Lopez also was mentioned five times in connection with efforts to revamp the laws regarding guns in schools.
80. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 81. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
of New York has been mentioned by members of Congress six times; 82 the precedential value of Printz has been mentioned twice.
83
While these measures are somewhat artificial, they are nonetheless telling. At a minimum, they suggest that Congress is not paying much attention to the signals the Court is sending it. Correspondingly, Congress seems more and more willing to jeopardize its legislative work through sloppy drafting. 84 On federalism-related issues, for example, the federal laws struck down "were quite poorly or negligently drafted." 85 In Lopez, Congress failed to engage in factfinding, make a jurisdictional statement, or otherwise consider the constitutionality of its handiwork. 86 In the Violence Against Women Act, Congress did assemble a "mountain of data . 86. See Devins, supra note 42, at 1194. The fact that the Supreme Court had not signaled (through pre-Lopez decisionmaking) that such factfinding might be relevant to its assessment of the statute does not excuse Congress's sloppiness. In critical respects, Lopez responded to Congress's increasingly cavalier attitude toward the scope of its Commerce Clause powers. In particular, Congress federalized all sorts of things without engaging in factfinding or contemplating the ways in which such federalization expanded the workload of federal judges. See infra notes 106-10 and accompanying text (discussing how federalization affected the federal judiciary). And while a Supreme Court with different values would not have interceded, the Court's action in Lopez-notwithstanding the lack of prior notice-can be understood as a response to Congress's negligence.
87. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 628-29 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting). Congress assembled this data to respond to complaints that the statute had little to do with com-grounding the statute in both Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause, Congress disregarded the wellsettled rule that it could not use its Section 5 power to regulate private conduct. 88 And in several cases restricting Congress's Section 5 powers, Congress's factfinding was too limited or nonexistent. 89 In particular, Congress failed to convince the Court that it was responding to a nationwide problem involving both state and private actors. 90 For these very reasons, the Court, while invalidating scores of federal laws, has had to overturn only three of its precedents.
91
Making matters worse, Congress had every reason to expect that the Court would make it pay a price for its sloppiness. 93 the Court may well have seen these attempts to expand the scope of federal power as little more than Congress pandering to popular sentiment.
No doubt, a Court with different values may have welcomed-as Senator Joseph Biden put it-Congress's federalizing "'everything that walks, talks, and moves.'" 94 The Rehnquist Court, however, is not that Court. Rather than look the other way, it seized upon Congress's sloppiness. 95 Put another way, Congress had significant control over its fate. Had Congress acted more cautiously, the Rehnquist Court may have deferred the return of the "Constitution in Exile."
96

C. Congress and the Management of the Federal Judiciary
Congress has jeopardized its relationship with the Supreme Court further through its handling of several matters affecting the day-to-day lives of federal judges, including judicial salaries, the pace of judicial confirmations, and a range of issues affecting federal judges' workloads. And while some of these matters have no direct relationship to Court decisionmaking on federalism-related issues, it is nevertheless true that the attitudes of federal judges, including Su- 95. Professor Keith Whittington, in his response to Professor Schroeder's paper, puts it this way: "The federalism offensive can best be understood as a product of the Court's taking advantage of a relatively favorable political environment to advance a constitutional agenda of particular concern to some individuals within the Court's conservative majority." Keith E. Whittington, Taking What They Give Us: Explaining the Court's Federalism Offensive, 51 DUKE L.J.
477, 479 (2001).
96. The fact that the Rehnquist Court often divides 5-4 on federalism-related issues bolsters this claim. Specifically, if any member of the Rehnquist Court majority had been influenced by Congress's cavalier approach to federalism-related issues, the Court would have lacked the majority it needed to push through its federalism counterrevolution. See infra note 128 (collecting sources that suggest that Congress still retains the power to pursue initiatives that the Rehnquist Court has invalidated on federalism-related grounds).
preme Court Justices, toward Congress are affected by Congress's management of issues related to the judiciary. In other words, a Court that has doubts about Congress's trustworthiness will find it easier to constrain Congress than will a Court that has a high regard for Congress. 97 Over the past five years, Chief Justice Rehnquist has used his year-end report on the federal judiciary to encourage Congress to live up to its responsibility "to enable the judges to do a better job of administering justice."
98 Consider, for example, judicial salaries. In 1996, Rehnquist complained that Congress's failure to pay judges a competitive salary "cannot be overstated in terms of its effects on the morale and quality of the federal judiciary."
99 Four years later, in supporting the repeal of a congressional ban on honoraria, Rehnquist pointed to the fact that "'a first-year associate in a law firm could make as much in salary as a federal judge,'" and again argued that Congress was undermining "'the ability of the judiciary to retain and recruit the most capable lawyers.'" 100 Making matters worse, Congress-from 1997 to 1999-refused to make cost-of-living adjustments to judicial salaries. 101 And while Congress's action may be more a result of the politics surrounding congressional pay than anything else, lawmaker insensitivity to judicial salaries nevertheless harmed Congress-Court relations.
102
Far more damaging to Congress-Court relations, however, is a constellation of interconnected issues involving both the workload of federal judges and the types of cases that federal judges hear. First, the total number of cases filed in the federal courts of appeals has in-97. In making this point, I do not mean to suggest that Supreme Court Justices would knowingly retaliate against Congress for its poor management of judiciary-related issues. My point, instead, is that there is a correlation between attitudes toward government and Supreme Court decisionmaking. See Schroeder, supra note 4, at 346-51 (discussing the impact of public distrust of government on the growing opposition to federalization).
98 creased more than seventy percent over the past two decades. 103 During the same period, federal district courts saw the total number of criminal cases increase by fifty percent, with drug cases tripling. 104 As a result, "[c]ivil cases are often placed on the back burner, in some jurisdictions, as the judges try to cope with the flood of drug and gun cases." 105 Second, Congress has contributed to this explosion of federal litigation by increasingly federalizing matters (especially crime). 106 More than "40 percent of federal criminal provisions enacted since the Civil War have been enacted since 1970." 107 Among other things, Congress has criminalized many things that the states already outlaw, including drug crimes, carjacking, failure to pay child support, embezzlement from an insurance company, drive-by shootings, and possession of a handgun near a school. 108 For their part, the federal courts have resisted this increasing federalization. In 1995 and again in 1998, the Judicial Conference lobbied Congress to "commit itself to conserving the federal courts as a distinctive forum of limited jurisdiction in our system of federalism." 109 Chief Justice Rehnquist, moreover, used his bully pulpit to warn Congress of the costs of federalizationclogging the courts' dockets, overworking federal judges, changing the character of the types of cases that federal judges adjudicate, and, perhaps most significantly, damaging "our system of federalism." 110 Third, Congress (as far as federal judges are concerned) added insult to injury both by failing to create additional judgeships to meet a litigation explosion that is largely its making and by holding up judicial and Sentencing Commission nominations. All of these matters have figured prominently in Rehnquist's year-end reports on the federal judiciary. In January 1998, Rehnquist depicted the Senate's failure to confirm judicial nominees as threatening to "'erod[e] the quality of justice.'" 111 Again in January 1999, he spoke of the need-with the increasing federalization of crime-to have "a fully functioning Sentencing Commission" and described the "political impasse" between the President and Congress as "stunning."
112 Finally, in January 1998 and January 2000, he spoke of the need for Congress to "eliminate the disparity between resources and workload in the claims about what is in the best interest of the judicial branch may "obscure the judges' self-interested personal motivations for preserving and enhancing their own positions in the system,"
115 it is nevertheless true that the Supreme Court has ample reason to point the finger at Congress for changing (for the worse) the job of being a federal court judge. It is hardly surprising that this change has occurred during the same period that the Court increasingly has struck down acts of Congress. The Court's view of Congress is shaped, in part, by Congress's interest in addressing matters that the judiciary deems essential to the administration of justice. 116. Of course, the Justices' principal concern is the statute the constitutionality of which is being challenged. Nevertheless, judicial attitudes toward Congress are likely to be a contributing factor in defining the Court's views on Congress's trustworthiness and, with it, the Court's willingness to take a hard look at Congress's handiwork. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (noting the correlation between congressional actions and Supreme Court decisionmaking).
117. Professor Schroeder, therefore, is correct in calling attention to how "motivated reasoning" affects Court decisionmaking. See Schroeder, supra note 4, at 352-56 (reasoning that general distrust of the federal government provides Justices with a reason to prefer limiting federal power). Just as the Justices (perhaps subconsciously) factor attitudes toward Congress's trustworthiness into their decisionmaking, the Justices also are apt to take into account Congress's views about its role in constitutional interpretation.
That Congress is partially to blame for bringing back the "Constitution in Exile" cannot be denied. The Rehnquist Court, already predisposed to pay close attention to issues involving the scope of Congress's power, has seized upon Congress's failure to take seriously its role as coequal interpreter of the Constitution. But why is Congress increasingly cavalier in its handling of constitutional questions? To begin with, lawmakers have little incentive to sacrifice their individual interests for something as abstract as Congress's institutional interest in asserting its voice as coequal interpreter of the Constitution. 118 In particular, members of Congress need to be reelected to advance their (and their constituents') interests. With little to gain by raising constitutional objections to a politically popular bill, lawmakers would rather vote for the measure and leave it to the courts to sort out the bill's constitutionality. 119 Nothing, of course, is new about this practice; nevertheless, several recent developments have conspired to make Congress especially insensitive to the constitutional fate of its enactments.
First, Congress not only increasingly delegates its core powers to others, but also, in explaining why, it often points the finger at itself for the failings of government. Witness, for example, the 1994 Contract with America. Premised on the belief that Congress is irresponsible and unworthy of trust, the Contract with America ostensibly sought to limit congressional power in several ways, including by imposing term limits, prohibiting unfunded mandates, and creating the line-item veto. On the line-item veto, for example, Senator Dan Coats and others argued: Congress "cannot discipline itself. . . . [It] is selfish and greedy and . . . cannot put the national interest ahead of parochial interests or special interests." 120 And while the Contract with America has fizzled, Congress remains ready, willing, and eager to cede core powers-especially budgetary and war powers. 121 This pattern is likely to continue, for the declining public trust in government creates incentives for lawmakers to distance themselves from Congress by engaging in mutual self-flagellation. 122 Second, Congress has little incentive to take recent Supreme Court decisions into account and thereby slow down the pace of federalization because interest groups increasingly prefer national legislation to state and local measures.
123 As compared to lobbying fifty state legislatures, for example, there is a far lower transaction cost associated with national legislation. 124 More significantly, the political culture has become increasingly nationalized. Changes both in media coverage and advertising have made all politics national-so that guns in schools, carjacking, and the like are considered national, not local, problems. 122. See Schroeder, supra note 4, at 347 (providing a graph gauging the rise and fall of public trust in government from Court efforts to protect state prerogatives. 126 For this very reason, Representative Lee Hamilton, after observing that lawmakers seemed "detached from the actual work of the federal judiciary, particularly as it relates to the exercise of congressional power," speculated that Congress "has become more conservative, and many members are comfortable with most of the Court's rulings."
127 Moreover, Supreme Court decisions have not prevented Congress from responding to constituent demands. Congress has the tools to respond to many of these decisions. For example, it can recraft a bill by grounding it in a different source of federal power or it can narrow its scope. 128 Finally, because much of what is struck down is redundant of state enactments, Congress will feel relatively little constituent pressure to respond to the Court. 129 Fourth, Congress increasingly is concerned with "message politics," that is, using the legislative process to make a symbolic statement to voters and other constituents. 130 Rather than look to commit-tee leadership to define Congress's agenda, Republicans and Democrats alike see the lawmaking process as expressive, a way for the members of each party to coalesce behind their party's policy agenda. 131 Likewise, by focusing its efforts on the message it is sending, Congress places less emphasis on what happens to legislation after it is enacted. Instead of negotiating with the president over the specifics of legislation (so as to stave off a possible veto), "Congress can, and routinely does, pass laws deliberately designed to provoke a presidential veto."
132 Likewise, a Court decision striking down legislation is not especially problematic. Indeed, the Court's decision creates an occasion for Congress to revisit the issue and, in this way, facilitates lawmaker efforts to, once again, send a symbolic message to voters and other constituents. 133 Congress has yet to see the return of the "Constitution in Exile" as especially problematic. The changing face of lawmaking places less emphasis on securing presidential and judicial approval of legislation and more emphasis on doing what is politically popular (federalizing crime, for example). So long as the Court is not standing in the way of urgent constituent demands, there is little reason for Congress to break out of this pattern. In other words, the constitutional counterrevolution that so preoccupies legal academics appears little more than a blip on Congress's radar screen.
For the Rehnquist Court, however, Congress's apparent indifference to its rulings is anything but insignificant. The Court waited until the 1994 elections before launching its counterrevolution, and even then the Court moved gingerly-striking down relatively few laws and striking them down on somewhat ambiguous grounds. 134 Today, guing that "message politics" shapes the strategic decisions of legislators at all stages of the lawmaking process however, the Court seems more aggressive, and with good reason. Congress, if anything, is encouraging the Court through both indifference and ill-considered legislation. Moreover, there is little reason to fear a populist backlash like the one launched against Lochner-era judicial decisionmaking. 135 The Court remains politically popular 136 and somewhat middle-of-the-road on divisive social policy issues such as late-term abortions and school prayer. 137 Also, when the Court strikes down a law, it typically leaves Congress room to revisit the issue. 138 Of course, it is not impossible that the Court's increased willingness to invalidate Congress's statutes will become a politically salient issue-one that spurs Congress into action. 139 As the New Deal
